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Abstract 
Research purpose-The purpose of this study is to identify the motivations behind the 
procurement outsourcing decision, find out what specific activities in a procurement cycle the 
firms have outsourced and what the benefits and challenges they have experienced, in the context 
of Norwegian society.  
Approach- A review of various literature on procurement, outsourcing and procurement 
outsourcing, to identify what researches have been done before and what research need to be 
done in this paper. The limited literature on procurement outsourcing marks the significant 
contribution of this empirical research work. Two theories: Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
and Principal-Agent Theory, have been applied, in order to try to explain certain behaviors behind 
outsourcing, such as opportunistic behavior of suppliers, due to human nature of self-interest; 
bounded rationality of both customers/(principals) and the suppliers/(agents) and the problems 
of the incongruent goals of the outsourcer and procurement outsourcing service vendor. Hence, 
I also bring in the topic of risk management and discuss it briefly. 
Findings-Findings shows that most commonly experienced benefits by outsourcing procurement 
functions from different Norwegian public institutes and private firms are cost savings, improved 
core business focus and shared knowledge, followed by other benefits. This is largely congruent 
with earlier research. However, the experienced challenges/risks are vastly different from each 
other, some organizations experienced reduced control with service vendors, others found it 
difficult to cooperate with their suppliers, whilst some customers stated the services they received 
were not sufficiently customized, and one institute experienced additional hidden cost problems 
after outsourcing implementation, which challenges the TCE theory to some degree. Risk 
management seems very necessary in such a context, and much more research and practices have 
to be carried out in the future for the procurement outsourcing as business solution to grow and 
bloom. 
Key words: Procurement, outsourcing, procurement outsourcing, Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE), Principal-Agent Theory, benefits, challenges /risks. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Procurement outsourcing is a relative new business area. It has great economic potential on cost 
savings, and improvement of the enterprise performance on a strategic level.  It is a rising 
business strategy. 
 Procurement  
Procurement, which encompasses all activities required to get the goods/services from suppliers 
to buyers, has been playing an essential role to the economic performance of an enterprise, which 
aims at profit making. It plays also an important role on public institutions, which have political 
and social responsibilities as their key concerns. 
Procurement has supply as its primary task, and therefore, has a key role in supply chain 
management. 
According to van Weele (2010), procurement is referred to buying, which bases on the Total 
Cost of Ownership (TCO) rather than on a purchasing price. TCO concerns the cost of owning 
something for its lifetime. 
Procurement is a long and complex process which covers a series of activities: from needs 
identification, specification, to supplier market research, supplier selection, to issuing request for 
quotation (RFQ), inspections, controls, to evaluate supplier’s performance and many more. In 
general, these activities can be categorized into some groups, and here we apply a framework 
which is adapted from Brewer (2014), because its simplicity and thoroughness. In this framework, 
procurement cycle is divided into 5 phases:” Establish a purchasing strategy, evaluate suppliers, 
screen and select suppliers, procure materials, measure and manage supplier performance”. 
With the development of IT technology, e-procurement (procurement through internet) has been 
much applied. E-reverse auction (eRA) is the most popular form of it. By applying e-procurement, 
it saves time and transaction cost for both buyers and suppliers. 
12 
 
 Outsourcing 
On the need for greater efficiencies, cost reduction has forced many organizations to specialize 
in a limited number of key areas (McIvor, 2009). This has led the organizations to outsource 
activities traditionally were operated in-house.  
Since 1996, outsourcing has grown dramatically (Van Weele, 2010). McIvor (2009) declares that, 
with time, outsourcing has moved on from peripheral oriented activities such as cleaning, 
catering and security, to encompass more critical business activities such as design, manufacture, 
human resource, and logistics.  
Outsourcing can be applied in general in two forms: partial or complete outsourcing. Offshoring 
is also a special type of outsourcing, and it has been applied through decades. The term usually 
refers to outsourcing of the work to a foreign low-cost country. For example, China has been a 
popular destination of offshoring for European textile and electronic industry, and India is 
popular for IT support and call centers. 
Outsourcing in general has evolved through three generations: tactical, strategic and 
transformational stages. 
Tactical outsourcing is a problem-solving oriented strategy, it focuses on cost saving through 
outsourcing of operational activities such as IT systems, payroll or call center services (Kedia 
and Lahiri, 2007).  It is a short-term action. 
Strategic outsourcing is more long-term, and characterized by joint-ventures or strategic alliance 
(Lee et al. 2010).   
Transformational outsourcing focuses on win-win long-term relationship. It stresses competitive 
advantage on enterprise-level and risk sharing between suppliers and buyers. 
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 Procurement outsourcing 
Procurement outsourcing is a broad term encompassing a wide range of strategic and tactical 
activities, and therefore may become difficult to study precisely (Brewer 2014). 
The motivation for procurement outsourcing is often to improve performance (Brewer 2014). 
There are different benefits by outsourcing the procurement function. 
Favre et al. (2003) says procurement outsourcing has been shown to potentially reduce 
operational costs by 15–20%, and Hesketh (2008) says administrative costs could be saved by 
up to 75%.  
In addition to cost saving on transactional level and increased process discipline (John, 2003), 
increased contract compliance (Favre et al. 2003) are also some of the benefits of procurement 
outsourcing. Some other benefits of procurement outsourcing are: freeing up certain assets to 
core business, external expertise sharing, and increased flexibility. 
According to Amaral et al. (2006), outsourcing procurement can reduce supply-base visibility, 
leading to unauthorized part or supplier substitutions, overbilling, and risk of supplier 
opportunism. 
As much as benefits, there are also many challenges waiting ahead of procurement outsourcing. 
Becoming too dependent on the outsourcing vendor, losing control of supplier performance, costs, 
and legal issues (Parry et al. 2006), internal resistance and hidden cost are some of the typical 
challenges. 
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 Procurement in Norway 
 Table 1-1   Public procurement is increasing 
Source: SSB (Statistics Central Agency-Public purchases 2014) 
As Table 1-1 shows, the public procurement, which encompasses both public administration and 
public business operations, is increasing. From 2013-2014, it increased with 5.3%, which is 
451.508 billion Norwegian kroner. This was around 14.57% of the national GDP. 1 
From 2010-2014, public procurement had increased 25.6%.  
The great increase indicates that procurement is playing an increasingly important economic role 
in the national economy, hence, excellent management of it is necessary. This offers the 
outsourcing strategy a great economic potential. 
 
                                                 
1  (The   data is calculated as such: (451.508*6,3)/449.8≈14.57 the GDP of 2014 was 449.8 million U.S.A 
dollars (World-Bank, 2016), and the average currency was USD: NOK = 1:6.3(DNB, 2016)) 
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1.4.1 Stricter regulations on public procurement 
The Norwegian government released an article named “Stricter enforcement of public 
procurement” in 2011. According to the article, the government had presented a proposal for 
stricter regulation for public procurement. One of the important intentions in the proposal was to 
counteract gross violation of the regulations, with special concern on violation of the requirement 
for open competition on public procurement (Ministry of Government Administration, Reform 
and Church Affairs, 2011). 
Svane and Hansen (2015) stated that the legislation of public procurement, which Norway had 
been following- Procurement Act of 1999 (The Act) was under revision. New regulations of 
public procurement in EU would carry out in 2016, and it would be incorporated in Norway. The 
new regulations will increase access to public procurement markets for SME (Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises) and other underrepresented categories of bidders (Svane and Hansen , 
2015). 
By stricter regulations on public procurement in Norway, the competition environment would be 
improved, and it may lead to a more effective public procurement practice in the country. 
 
 Research purpose 
The purpose of this study is to identify the motivations behind the procurement outsourcing 
decisions, find out what specific activities in a procurement cycle the firms have outsourced and 
what the benefits and challenges they have experienced. Hence, through the study of earlier 
research and my own analysis, I aim to suggest some solutions to reduce the challenges. 
 Research question 
What benefits and challenges have Norwegian firms who outsourced their procurement function 
experienced, and how they may implement strategies and processes to mitigate the risks? 
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Chapter 2      Literature Review 
 
To perceive a holistic view on the topic of “procurement outsourcing”, a literature review is 
needed. Because it consists vast of the study on this topic (or peripheral areas of such a topic), 
which offers a guideline of understanding the topic. By reviewing what has been done, it is easier 
to identify what should be done in the future research. The source of chosen literature in this 
thesis are published journal articles, books, websites and master thesis.  
2.1.1 Procurement or purchasing? 
Procurement is often interchanged with the concept of purchasing. However, there are both 
similarities and differences. 
Van Weele (2010) defines procurement as following: 
“All activities required in order to obtain the product from the supplier to its final destination. It 
encompasses the purchasing function, store, traffic and transportation, incoming inspection, and 
quality control and assurance” (p. 6). 
From this definition, we shall understand that purchasing and procurement is not identical, 
purchasing is a part of procurement process.  
Van Weele (2010) defines purchasing as: 
 “The management of the company’s external resources in such a way that the supply of all goods, 
services, capabilities and knowledge which are necessary for running, maintaining and 
managing the company’s primary and support activities is secured at the most favorable 
conditions” (p. 3). 
Quayle et al. (2000) argues that purchasing is more concerned with commercial relationship 
establishment and management, whereas procurement is in addition concerned with the control 
aspects on physical material and service delivery after the contract has been signed, or the order 
has been placed. 
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These two terms are often used interchangeably, which makes it difficult to distinguish them 
purely by theoretical definitions. Therefore, in this research, we also ignore the difference 
between procurement and purchasing and see them as the same concept. 
 As Quayle et al. (2000) observed, in the mid- 1970s, only 21 percent of procurement managers 
reported that they frequently participated in their employer's corporate planning process, but it 
increased to 43 percent by the mid- 1980s. This leads to the idea that, procurement has evolved 
its role in corporate strategy and is gradually becoming more important in corporate performance. 
This idea is consistent with the Reck and Long (1998). They argue that the procurement function 
has over time become an integral part of every firm’s competitive success.  
2.1.2 Procurement Organization Structures 
In general, there are three types of organizational structures: Centralized, decentralized, and 
hybrid buying system of centralized and decentralized procurement systems. The most employed 
ones are centralized procurement and decentralized procurement. 
2.1.2.1 Centralized Procurement System (CPS) 
Centralized procurement process is a top-down process, where communication and coordination 
emanate from the top to down, while control and internal program consistency are enhanced by 
centralization (McCue and Pitzer, 2000). 
2.1.2.2 De-Centralized Procurement System (DCPS) 
Cavinato (1992) argues that this organizational model consists of procurement being located at 
different field sites and the personnel report directly to the general manager or line-of-business 
manager only at these locations. It appears that firms with decentralized procurement also have 
decentralized logistics. In this way, it serves to minimize corporate overhead (Cavinato 1992). 
 Distinction between the centralized and decentralized buying system is easy to observe: Whilst 
there is only one purchasing organization in CPS, there are different or perhaps specialized 
purchasing departments in each location of the firm in DCPS. 
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2.1.2.3 Hybrid buying system 
Hybrid buying system combines the advantages of both CPS and DCPS, and can be applied 
according to, for example, the value of items and plant location. 
Each system has its own advantages and disadvantages, and they are briefly summarized as 
follows: 
Table 2-1   Advantages, disadvantages of different buying systems 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
CPS Easy to apply scales of economy. 
Lower transportation cost per unit 
Reduced / eliminated double procurement 
effort 
 
Difficult for tailored service. 
Problematic to utilize local 
resources. 
Create internal hierarchy/ 
bureaucracy. 
 
DCPS Reduction in transportation cost and lead 
time 
Close coordination with local production 
schedules 
Promotes democratic practices 
Firms are geographically dispersed 
More expensive administrative cost, 
and more expensive cost on supplier 
relationship management. 
Source: Author’s summary from Neupane’s work (2012) 
As we know, the procurement is a process, which consists of many different activities. We name 
such a process as a procurement cycle. 
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2.1.3 The Procurement Cycle  
“The procurement cycle is more or less a road map of the activities within a procurement 
function. It establishes key activities required at every stage of the procurement process while at 
the same time providing a benchmark for the monitoring and evaluation of the process by 
procurement monitors and evaluators. “Explained by Geo (2008, p.35). 
As always, there are several different opinions about what activities should be included in a 
procurement cycle. Some theorists made a model with eight steps, while others made a 
framework with five or thirteen steps. Hereby, we choose a solid one to illustrate what a 
procurement cycle is.  
Table 2-2   Procurement cycle 
Phase1: 
Establishing a 
purchasing 
strategy  
Phase2: 
Supplier 
evaluation 
 
Phase3:  
Screen and 
select suppliers 
Phase 4:  
Procure 
materials 
Phase 5: Measure and 
Manage Supplier 
Performance 
 Analysis of 
Supply market 
 Identify 
qualified 
suppliers 
 Release RFP  Monitor 
inventory 
 Monitor supplier’s 
performance 
 Manufacturing 
requirements 
 Develop 
selection criteria 
 Analyze bids & 
past performance 
 Order materials  Identify improvement 
opportunities 
 Importance of 
materials 
  Select final 
suppliers 
 Receive 
materials 
 Analyze supplier 
relationships 
 Potential 
customer use and 
demand 
  Negotiate and 
finalize contract 
 Inspect 
materials 
 
Source: Adapted and revised from Brewer (2014) 
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Phase 1: Establishing a purchasing strategy 
As Table 2-2   shows, except for analysis of the supply market, the other three criterions can be 
grouped into one: specification of the purchase strategy. Such specification can be technical 
specification or purchase order specification. 
Technical specification can be, for example, the diameter, type, and temperature tolerance of tires 
in a truck. 
According to van Weele (2010), purchase order specification can be quality specification, legal 
specification for safety issues and logistics specification, such as quantity.  
Phase2: Evaluate potential suppliers 
After the purchasing specification is made, looking for potential suppliers starts. A supplier 
market research beforehand is necessary to identify a pool of qualified suppliers. To determine 
which suppliers should be contacted further, certain selection criteria has to be made. Selection 
criteria can be, for example, price, quality and cash flow. 
Phase 3: Screen and selecting suppliers 
Several activities are included in the process of supplier selection. 
 Release RFP, Analyze bids & past performance 
When contacting potential bidders, the customer often send out a RFI (Request For Information), 
to obtain more information about the suppliers, such as past experiences on similar projects, 
business areas and strategic focuses and so on. 
After this process, less bidders will be contacted again for a RFQ (Request For Quotation), and 
in general, it is a quotation for price. 
And then, even less bidders will be contacted again for an RFP (Request for Proposal). RFP is a 
proposal to solve the specific problem of the customer, include what approaches, which 
techniques and price for each approach. 
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After receiving the RFP, a final decision will be made on who will be the final supplier/suppliers.  
Contract and negotiation process will then take place. 
 Contracting and negotiation 
A contract is a legal document, which allows both parties to “maximize the rewards of the 
relationship, while minimizing the risk “(van Weele, 2010, p.171).  
At this part, prices, terms of payment, delivery terms and penalty clauses plus warranty 
conditions have to be agreed on. 
According to van Weele (2010), in general, a fixed price is definitely preferred due to cost control 
or budget management. However, in practice, business processes are dynamic and ever-changing, 
hence, different price politics have been applied: Fixed-price plus incentives, Cost-plus contract, 
cost-reimbursable contracts and agreement with price-adjustment (van Weele, 2010), to name 
some of them. This is a clear indication for the complexity of price issues. 
Delivery terms vary from situation to situation, and much negotiations have to be conducted 
before a final agreement is achieved. 
As van Weele(2010) stresses, ”an important clause in the contract is to agree on what legal 
system the contract will be subject to”( p. 39). This is especially important when it relates to 
offshoring. 
 A SLA (Service Level Agreement) is a special type of contract. It defines risk-and-gain sharing 
policies, operating specifics, and entitles the rights and obligations of both parties. Key 
performance indicators (KPI) such as cost, quality level and services are included (van Weele, 
2010) in a SLA. In general, a SLA includes also incentives for exceeding targets and penalties 
for sub-par performance. It should, in principle, allows for bilateral transfer of methods, 
processes, and knowledge, and encourage continuous process for improvement (eSourcing Wiki, 
2016). 
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Phase 4: Procure materials 
When supplier is selected, contract is negotiated in phase three, a purchase order will be followed 
up from the customer to the selected suppliers. In general, a purchase order contains information 
about the quantity, agreed price, terms of delivery and delivery date of goods. When materials 
are received, they have to be checked carefully to ensure the quality meets the requirement. 
Phase 5: Measure and manage supplier performance 
The procurement continues after goods are received. Supplier performance needs to be measured 
and the principal-agent relationship needs to be evaluated in order to see if some agents have 
behaved opportunistically and if there is possibilities for further improvement. 
According to van Weele (2010), it is beneficial for buyers to record “the supplier’s quality and 
delivery record, competitiveness and innovativeness “ ( p. 43), because such data contributes for 
vendor rating, and is useful for future buying. 
These five steps is a simplified framework or guideline for what should be included in a 
procurement process. However, in reality, the precise activities in a procurement cycle may differ 
from time to time, due to law regulations, situation changes (for example, natural disaster), and  
the nature of demand: goods or services, public or private procurement. 
2.1.4 Public vs private procurement 
According to Jafaar and Radzi (2012), the essential difference between public and private 
procurement action is that they serve different objectives: public procurement aims to serve the 
society while private one is to obtain maximum return on investment (ROI). In addition, public 
sector decision-makers are bureaucrats, and they have to follow accountability and transparency 
principles (Jafaar and Radzi 2012). Fumeaux et al. (2008) argues that 'public values' such as 
listening to public opinion, professionalism, risk-readiness and balancing of interests are also 
important requirements for a public procurement decision makers to follow.  
In contrast, private sector clients are mainly motivated by ROI and the project is expected to 
serve the company's vision, mission and goals (Rameezdeen and Jayasena, 2013). 
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In such a case, private sectors are freer than public sections to make procurement decisions, since 
there are not so many regulations, law or requirements to follow (Rameezdeen and Jayasena, 
2013). 
With the development of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange), E-procurement as an effective 
working method is developing dramatically. 
2.1.5 E-procurement 
In a simplified understanding, e-procurement is to procure goods/services on internet. 
Min and Galle (2003) define e-procurement as: business-to-business purchasing practice that 
utilizes electronic commerce to identify potential sources of supply, to purchase goods and 
services, to transfer payment, and to interact with suppliers. 
 Wu et al. (2007) advocate that e-procurement is the use of information technologies to facilitate 
business-to-business (B2B) purchase transactions for materials and services.  
 According to de Boer et al. (2002), there are six different forms of e-procurement: e-ordering, 
web-based ERP (web-based Enterprise Resource Planning), e-sourcing, e-tendering, e-reverse 
auctioning and e-informing.  
Mukhopadhyay and Kekre (2002) argues e-procurement could offer both strategic and 
operational benefits for both suppliers and customers. 
Some characteristics of e-procurement include online bidding, digital signatures, and e-reverse 
auctions. 
2.1.5.1 Online Bidding, Digital Signatures, and e-Reverse Auctions 
For online procurement, the first step is to place an order on a website. Requests for bids or 
proposals can then be placed on the web or emailed to contractors, and bidders can be notified 
immediately by email (Reddick, 2004). 
Technologies such as digital signatures are becoming well established, which makes it safer to 
procure over the InternetReddick,2004) A digital signature is an electronic means of signing 
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electronic documents that provides sender authentication using public-key encryption (Laudon 
& Laudon, 2001). 
E-reverse auction (eRA) as a popular form of e-procurement, has received great attention. 
 According to Raffa and Esposito (2006) “A reverse auction is a buyer-initiated auction in which 
a buyer asks for bids from multiple sellers; the price then decreases as sellers compete for the 
buyer's business with the lowest bid considered the winner”(pp. 46-49).  Reserve auction differs 
from “forward auction” (van Weele, 2010, p.6). 
 Forward auction or traditional auction is initiated by the supplier, while reverse auction is 
initiated by the buyer. In reverse auction, it is suppliers, who compete for a contract by submitting 
multiple bids with decreased price, while in forward auction, it is the buyers who compete for 
goods by submitting multiple bids with increased price. 
 Tassabehji et al. (2006) defined e-reverse auction as a forum wherein different suppliers 
compete online for contracts offered by a buyer.    
Hartley et al. (2006) see e-reverse auction  as an internet-enabled facility that allow suppliers to 
compete dynamically by submitting multiple electronic bids in real-time, and within a certain 
time-period. 
Online auctions allow geographically diverse buyers and sellers to exchange goods, services, and 
information, and to determine dynamically prices that reflect the demand and supply at a certain 
point of time so that efficient matching of supply and demand can be realized (Chen et al, 2005). 
2.1.5.2 Benefits and challenges by implementing e-Procurement 
There are various benefits of adapting e-procurement, among them, some are savings in 
purchasing transaction cost, resulted from less paperwork, less mistakes and more efficient 
purchasing process (Croom and Jones, 2007). 
An e-procurement solution will catalogue every transaction in the system, ensuring your records 
are kept up-to-date. Those records are of critical importance for financial forecasting, or an audit 
(Kolenko, 2014). 
26 
 
However, despite the allegedly massive benefits of applying e-procurement, the extent of 
adaption in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries is 
below expectations and progressing slowly (Pires and Stanton, 2005). This is because in addition 
to benefits, there are also several challenges in adapting e-procurement. 
Angeles and Nath (2007) argue that system integration, standardization and immaturity of e-
procurement market services are key challenges in e-procurement implementation, in private 
sectors. 
In public sections, the challenges are different. Aman and Kasimin (2011) categorizes these 
challenges into system specification and implementation management. Challenges in system 
specification (Aman and Kasimin, 2011) are related to both software integration, data 
management, and legal, plus administration procedures as well as IT infrastructure.  With respect 
to implementation management, the challenges are related to outsourcing contracts and IT skills. 
As illustrated, a procurement cycle consists of different activities: goods/services specifications, 
supplier evaluation and selection, contracting and negotiation, goods inspecting, supplier 
performance evaluation and more. To complete such a complex process, human and physical 
assets, knowledges and expertise are required, and this is definitely a process of money spending 
everywhere. Hence, how to save cost, in order to improve corporate performance becomes an 
important goal of procurement activities. This is where outsourcing as a strategy for such a goal 
comes in. 
 Outsourcing 
Outsourcing has been an important strategy for firms to focus on their key business areas, in 
order to cultivate its sustainable competitive advantages and to develop better. To explain it 
further, firms identify their own weaknesses or weak business activities and then outsource them 
to a third party, who is strong in that area. In this way, through work division, resources are 
allocated and utilized more efficiently. An example could be that universities outsource their 
procurement function to a third party, and concentrate on their key competence-educational 
capabilities. 
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2.2.1 Definition of outsourcing 
As outsourcing has been a research object in decades, there are many definitions of it. 
Brown and Wilson (2005) define outsourcing as “the act of obtaining services from an external 
source” (p. 20). 
Aubert et al. (2004) argues outsourcing is a typical example of a make-or-buy decision, and 
advocates that it can be defined as the “significant contribution by external vendors of the 
physical and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT 
infrastructure in the user organization” (pp. 921-932).  
Outsourcing is a strategic decision, which offers different organizations access to external 
capabilities or competencies so that they can compete in today’s global market (Mclvor, 2008). 
2.2.2 Types of outsourcing 
Based on the extent of outsourcing, van Weele (2010) distinguished between partial/incremental 
outsourcing and turn-key/complete outsourcing.  
 Partial/Incremental outsourcing 
According van Weele (2010), partial outsourcing can be understood as “only a part of an 
integrated function is outsourced” (p.162), while the coordination responsibilities and power still 
is in the hand of outsourcer. 
 Complete/Turn-key outsourcing 
As the name indicates, complete outsourcing implies that the outsourcer just need to turn the key 
of a door to get what they were intended to obtain (from the subcontractor), it is thus a 100 percent 
or complete outsourcing. 
This kind of outsourcing means the vendor takes in charge of all responsibilities and deliver a 
finished product, from searching for employees, materials procurement, negotiations with 
suppliers and more. In contrast, the outsourcer pays a package price for the completed product 
delivered by the supplier. This doesn’t mean the outsourcer does nothing in the process, they 
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have to coordinate with supplier, monitor the job progress and sometimes to take initiatives to 
push the suppliers in order to get the job done. 
2.2.3 Development of outsourcing in three generations 
According to Lee et al. (2010) outsourcing has been developed through three generations: tactical, 
strategic and transformational outsourcing. 
2.2.3.1 Tactical outsourcing 
Kedia and Lahiri (2007) argue that outsourcing in this level is attempting to reduce cost, and it 
is short term behavior. 
The key word of the tactical outsourcing is the “contract”, and the key point is to draw a precise 
contract and then ensure the supplier to fulfill the contract (Brown & Wilson, 2005). 
2.2.3.2 Strategic outsourcing 
At this time, outsourcing shifted its focus from cost saving to concentrate on core competence. 
Lee et al. (2010) makes the point, that having core activities in-house and outsource non-core 
activities, organizations are able to get a greater focus on their core activities, which will lead to 
a long term relationship building with suppliers. This is consistent with Sparrow’s (2003) idea 
that this model depicts the partnership between the client and the vendor, where they work 
towards the common interests. 
2.2.3.3 Transformational outsourcing: 
At this level, outsourcing is about “Partnering with another company to achieve a rapid, 
substantial and sustainable improvement in enterprise-level performance” (Linder 2004p.52) 
Lee et al. (2010) stresses transformational outsourcing has a great focus on risk-sharing and 
increased flexibility. 
Kedia and Lahiri (2007) stress that partnership or considering suppliers as allies towards gaining 
greater competitive advantage and market share is the key idea of transformational outsourcing.   
In summary, the key words for these three levels or generations of outsourcing are: 
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Table 2-3   Outsourcing's three generations 
Generations of outsourcing Key ideas Perspective 
1. Tactical outsourcing Cost saving Short-term 
2. Strategic outsourcing Core-competence focus Long-term 
3.Transformational outsourcing Partnership, alliance Long-term 
Source: Author’s own summary (2016), based on Lee et al. (2010), Kedia and Lahiri (2007).  
 Theoretical bases of outsourcing 
Although the ultimate goals between researchers and practitioners may differ in various ways, 
(Dubin, 1976), a strong theoretical model has great value to both of them (Cheon et al., 1995).  
A theory can work as a practical guidance for practitioners’ decision-makings or predictions for 
possible outcomes. For researchers, a theory explains the “why” behind certain phenomena. In 
this article, the chosen theoretical bases are “Transaction-Cost Economics (TCE) and Principal-
Agent theory”, because they explain well the economic issues on “buy or make” decisions and 
buyer-supplier relationships during the outsourcing processes.  
2.3.1 Transaction cost Economics (TCE) 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), is also named as Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), or 
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA), and has been employed by vast researchers to illustrate the 
phenomena of outsourcing. 
By this, we could interpret “make” as producing within the firm and “buy” as to outsource to 
another supplier. This is to say, TCE theory provides the theoretical background for decision on 
whether to produce goods / services internally or outsource it externally.  
The concept of transaction cost was first introduced by Ronald Coase (1937). He saw the market 
(outsourcing) and firm (make) as alternative mechanisms to each other, when to conduct a 
transaction. However, it was Oliver Eaton Williamson who made the TCE widely known in his 
Transaction Cost Economics (Wikipedia, 2016).  
When using market/ outsourcing, a transaction will occur, while to produce will the production 
cost to be occurred. Transaction cost is the cost needed to “run or fulfill” the trade between 
partners. The unit of analysis is the transactions. 
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TCA has two behavioral assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism (Wang, 2002). By 
bounded rationality it means limited rationality and Simon (1961) explains it as transacting 
parties intending to be rational, but limited by the nature of human rationality. 
 Opportunism is defined by Williamson (1975) as “self-interest seeking with guile” (p. 9). 
Williamson (1985) explains guile as “lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” (p.47). Carmel & Nicholson (2005), explains 
opportunism as the behavior, in which one transacting party takes advantage over another one. 
Williamson (1985), stresses that bounded rationality will create problem of writing incomplete 
contracts. Because of the limited/ bounded human rationality, it is hard to write contracts which 
include every possible unpredictable situations, such as a dramatic fire, fall of oil price, and loss 
of important employee and so on. 
In this theory, two costs determine whether the governance structure for a transaction is a market 
or hierarchy: production cost and transaction cost (Cheon et al., 1995). “Transaction cost theory 
examines outsourcing from an economic perspective, trading off transaction costs and 
production costs (Cheon et al., 1995)”. 
Williamson (1975) says it is the attributes of the transaction decide what constitute the most 
effective governance mode: market (outsource), hierarchy (make) or alliance (hybrid of 
outsourcing and making). 
 Three attributes will affect the transaction cost: asset specificity, uncertainty and infrequency.  
1. Asset specificity 
Joshi and Stump (1999), define asset specificity as “the non- redeployment of investment of one 
party in their partner” (p.336). 
McIvor (2008) explains that asset specificity is the level of customization or specification of the 
transaction, and it can be seen in different forms: Physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity and site specificity. Physical asset specificity is the level of specification of the 
physical product or services. Human asset specificity is the level of special human knowledge 
involved in the transactions. While site asset specificity refers to the specification of the locations. 
(For example, location of a telecom/electricity network). 
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The important point to understand the concept of asset specificity is to understand how 
specifically the asset is used in a transaction. 
2. Uncertainty 
This factor will impact the contract and its fulfillment (Williamson, 1985). 
The uncertainty may be a technological innovation (for example, touch screen technology of 
mobile phones), economic trends (economic crisis) or political issues.  
3. Infrequency 
This refers to the frequency of contracting or cooperation between two parties (Williamson, 
1985). Increased frequency of contracting will increase the transaction costs. 
Cheon et al. (1995) advocates that a linear relationship may express the decision on outsourcing: 
Outsourcing = f (transaction cost) 
Transaction cost = f (asset specificity, uncertainty, infrequency) 
The interpretation of the linear relationship is that an outsourcing decision depends on the 
transaction cost, and how high the transaction cost will be, which in the next turn depends on 
three factors: asset specificity, uncertainty, infrequency. 
According to McIvor (2008), transaction difficulties such as supplier opportunism and associated 
costs will increase when transactions are characterized by asset specificity, uncertainty and 
infrequency.  
According to Aubert et al. (2004), if the cost using market governance is too high, then internal 
production is a better option. We interpret it as: 
If transaction cost is higher than production cost, then “make”; 
If transaction cost is lower than production cost, then “outsource”. 
Although TCE alone is incomplete to decide whether activities should be in- or outsourced, it 
provides a useful guidance. 
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Principal-Agent Theory is another popular framework, which explains outsourcing behavior also 
very well. 
2.3.2 Principal-Agent Theory (Agency Theory) 
Principal-Agent Theory is a subset of Agency Theory.  
The basic idea behind it is that when hired by a principal, the agent should perform on the agent’s 
best interest. However, due to the human nature of self-interest, the agent may perform on his/her 
own interest rather than the principal’s. The principal has no capability to monitor the actions of 
the agent perfectly without cost (Sappington, 1991). 
Such relations exist everywhere: lawyer-client, employer-employee, a job seeker- job agency and 
many more. Information asymmetry and opportunism are the key words in such a relation 
Eisenhardt (1989). In a simple and easy understanding way, principal-agent relation can be 
understood as a seller-buyer relation.  In the context of outsourcing, the agent (seller) becomes 
the outsourcing service provider and the principal (buyer) becomes the outsourcing service buyer.  
 Information asymmetry refers to that an agent very often has more information than a principal, 
which leads to the asymmetry of information. However, on the other hand, this is also the reason 
why an agent is hired.  
 Opportunism is often associated with information asymmetry. When the agent has more access 
to information than the principal, and due to human nature of self-interest, opportunistic 
behaviors of agents will probably happen.  
To have a better understanding of principal-agent theory, we can take a look at the summarized 
table of Eisenhardt (1989).  
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 Table 2-4   Overview of principal-agent theory 
Key idea 
• Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis • Contract between principal and agent 
Human 
assumptions 
• Self-interest • Bounded rationality • Risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
• Partial goal conflict among participants • Efficiency as the 
effectiveness criterion Information asymmetry between principal and 
agent 
Information 
assumption 
• Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting 
problems 
• Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection)• Risk sharing 
Problem domain 
• Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, regulation, leadership, 
impression management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989, p.59) 
From Table 2-4, we are able to see the unit of analysis in principal-agent theory is the contract, 
and this is different from the unit of analysis of TCE-transactions. The human assumption as self-
interest / opportunism and bounded rationality are same as TCE, while risk aversion is an extra 
assumption in this theory.  
From this table, we can also see the importance of information in a principal-agent relation, since 
it can be seen as a purchasable commodity. AS Eisenhardt (1989) states in this table, risk 
preferences of a principal and an agent may differ partially, and this might lead to a contracting 
problem of risk sharing between them. Risk management in outsourcing (see 2.4.3, risk 
management in outsourcing) will be briefly discussed later. 
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 Procurement outsourcing 
In the definition of Hanson and Olson (2005), procurement outsourcing is the transfer of all or 
part of a range of sourcing-to-settlement processes. It includes sourcing, contracting and supplier 
management to a third party.  
(Manikandan, 2016) offers a more detailed definition: 
“Procurement Outsourcing is defined as a process wherein organizations take a calculated 
approach of moving some of their processes around source to pay to a specialist. This involves 
organizations identifying the core and non-core activities with source to pay and start 
outsourcing non-core activities to a specialist “. 
There are many benefits to outsource the procurement function. 
2.4.1 Benefits of procurement outsourcing  
2.4.1.1 Cost reduction 
 Favre et al. (2003) argue that across the board, procurement outsourcing can reduce costs of 
service and materials by up to 15 percent. They further explain that “significant savings can result 
from repositioning and centralizing large numbers of people and technologies, and avoiding 
burdensome investments in upgrades and new systems (Favre et al.2003)”. 
2.4.1.2 Core competence/business focus 
Improved focus on core competence/business is one of the most important reasons why firms 
choose to outsource their procurement functions. Outsourcing the procurement function, allows 
companies to concentrate on its core competencies and value-added activities, because it is these 
competencies and value-added activities which leads the firm to greater success (Davis et al., 
1998). 
For what is core competence, there are different understandings. 
Prahalad and Hamel define (1990) core competence as: "Core competencies are the collective 
learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate 
multiple streams of technologies" (pp. 6).  
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Hitt and Ireland (1986) define core competence as "a central set of problem-defining and problem 
solving insights that enable the firm to create potentially idiosyncratic strategic growth 
alternatives and to enact, at least partially, its environment " (pp. 401-416).  
2.4.1.3 Access higher levels of expertise and innovations  
To obtain external expertise and innovations is also an important driver for outsourcing decisions. 
According to Leenders & Flynn (1995), in a professional procurement service provider base, it 
is easier to gain access to new technologies and innovation. This is especially true in mobile and  
fashion industries.  
2.4.1.4 Risk sharing 
Outsourcing the procurement function allows sharing or overtaking the risk of supply 
interruptions, due to strikes, quality problem, political instability, or other supplier problems 
(Wisner & Tan, 2015). 
2.4.1.5 Increased flexibility 
van Weele (2005) argues that, since someone is sharing the workload, and it thus can be 
absorbed more easily, hence, outsourcing can increase flexibility.  
To get a better overview of the benefits, the following table summarized them up: 
Table 2-5 Benefits of procurement outsourcing 
Benefits of procurement outsourcing  
1. Cost reduction 
2. Core competence/business focus 
3. Access higher levels of expertise and innovations 
4. Risk sharing 
5. Increased flexibility 
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As Aubert et al. (2002) state, almost any business is associated with risks.  
2.4.2 Risks of procurement outsourcing 
Procurement outsourcing is a specific type of outsourcing. This implies the challenges confronted 
with outsourcing will all possibly happen while dealing with procurement outsourcing. 
According to Davison (2004), the most common10 risks of outsourcing are:  
1. Unrealistic high expectations on cost-reduction  
2. Data security  
3. Process of disciplines 
4. Loss of business expertise 
5. Vendor failure to deliver  
6. Scope creep  
7. Government regulation,  
8. Culture  
9. Turnover of key personnel  
10. Knowledge transfer  
Based on a case study, Marshall et al. (2007) stated that although outsourcing employees argued 
collaborative relations with service suppliers were being adopted, the research revealed that was 
not the case, because it was evidenced that these two parties had some adversarial tendencies.  
2.4.2.1 Increased dependency-loss of control 
Loss of control is often perceived, because the outsourcer very often find themselves having 
become too dependent on the service providers, especially when there is only a single supplier. 
2.4.2.2 Internal resistance 
Procurement outsourcing implies the current purchasers are going either to lose their jobs or to 
be reorganized in one or another way. This will mostly create problems between employees and 
the organization. It will probably create the psychological burden on the employees’ morale in 
which they may feel insecure or unappreciated by their management (Elmuti, 2003) and thus lead 
to internal resistance. 
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2.4.2.3  Integration of two organizations/ company cultures 
External vendors’ inadequate knowledge of the organizations will probably make it difficult to 
cooperate with the outsourcer in every detail during the procurement process (Elmuti, 2003). 
2.4.2.4 Hidden cost 
In business, hidden cost refers to the cost that was not included in the purchasing price of a goods 
or services, but turns out to be necessary to spend extra on these goods and services for them to 
work properly. Such cost include, for example, the cost for searching for outsourcing vendor, 
upgrading and training of an IT system. 
According to Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b), in general, hidden costs are the biggest problem of 
outsourcing. The hidden transition costs include such as setup costs, redeployment costs, 
relocation costs, and parallel-running costs. The hidden management costs such as the human 
resources needed to manage outsourcing contract, the hidden service costs, and all costs that the 
client assumed were included in the contract (baseline), but which, in fact, were not. 
2.4.2.5 Discontinuity of service delivery 
To manage the continuity of services delivery can be challenging. Agents very often overpromise 
their capability of service delivery at the negotiation stage, and it will lead to unrealistic 
expectations of the principals (Perkins, 2003).To reduce  the risks of loss, agents may terminate 
their services to their principals, who are redundant to pay the bills. 
2.4.2.6 Lock-in of specific asset 
“Lock-in” refers to a situation where a client/principal cannot get out of a relationship only if by 
accepting a loss or sacrificing part or all of its assets to the supplier/agent (Aubert et al., 1998). 
According to Klein (1978), a lock-in    situation    is a result of specific asset which is made by too 
few suppliers. When contract is signed, specific asset is settled by the limited suppliers, at  contract  
renewal  time,  if  no other  supplier  is  ready  to  make  specific  investments,  the client  may have 
to continue  cooperate  with  the  current  supplier. This offers the current supplier an opportunity to   
increase   its   fees,   due to lack   of alternatives.  
To summarize up the risks, the following table is offered: 
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Table 2-6 Challenges of procurement outsourcing 
Challenges of procurement outsourcing  
1. Increased dependency-loss of control 
2. Internal resistance 
3. Integration of two organizations/ company cultures 
4. Hidden cost 
5. Discontinuity of service delivery 
6. Lock-in of specific asset 
 
2.4.3 Risk management in outsourcing  
Outsourcing benefits cannot be realized only if the potential risks are minimized or eliminated, 
which leads to the topic of risk management. According to Zhao and Watanabe (2010), risks are 
shared by both outsourcer and outsourcing service vendor, and risk management is thus 
indispensable for both parts. In this thesis, analysis of risk management will be limited to the 
outsourcer part.  
Zhao and Watanabe (2010) claim that risk  management have been studied in various fields, 
finance, insurance and project management and it recently became a hot topic in 
outsourcing service. 
Porter (1980) recommends having multiple vendors to share risks and increase the bargaining 
power of the outsourcer. This might reduce the lock-in problem. However, whether it is best to 
have one single or multiple vendors, Ngwenyama and Bryson (1999) suggest use of transaction 
cost theory approach to analyze the profit of outsourcer and cost of vendors. 
 Padovani and Young (2008) state that simply monitoring a contract is not enough to prevent 
risks to happen, the monitoring must be supplemented with some other activities. Kettner and 
Martin (1985) suggest such activities could include (1) periodically reviewing progress toward 
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the accomplishment of contractual terms, (2) identifying areas that require corrective action or 
renegotiations. 
Van Weele (2010) states he observed that developing trust and partnership atmosphere was vital 
for outsourcing action to succeed, however, how to reach this point becomes a new issue.  
After the decision on outsourcing the procurement function is made, many issues have to be 
managed in order to succeed in this action. John (2003) pointed out some factors: 
1. The outsourcer must proactively help the procurement outsourcing service provider to 
understand how its business works. 
2. Thorough communication between three parts: outsourcer, suppliers and internal customers 
must take place, both before and after the changeover.  
3. A new environment for transferred staff is necessary, either in a different environment or 
getting the old work areas to be redecorated. 
There are two solutions to mitigate the problems of “lock-in”: mutual hostage (Koss and Eaton, 
1997) and dual sourcing/multiple vendors (Kern et al., 2002). Mutual hostage mean both 
principal and agent share investment costs and form a partnership. For instance, the principal 
could invest time and effort to learn more about the agent’s firm(s) and the agent may also invest 
in physical equipment, site relocation, human resources learning, etc.  
To mitigate of hidden cost, there are two proposals: Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) propose hiring 
of external technical and legal expertise. Ouchi (1980) suggest clean mechanisms through 
socialization and shared organizational norms and values. Hiring external technical expertise is 
to help incompetent or immature firms to draw a proper contract regarding technical specifics 
and external legal expertise will avoid some renegotiations. By this, it means that, for example, 
a new established firm, which in general, is immature, and thus may not knowing all technical 
specifications of goods they are going to purchase. Therefore, an external expertise may help the 
firm to save much time and resource on identifying the technical specifications. Shared norms 
and values will in some degree reduce unnecessary communications, prevent opportunistic 
behavior and hence reduce some hidden cost. 
40 
 
 Procurement outsourcing in practice 
A survey on strategic outsourcing shows that firms are outsourcing up to 20% of transaction 
activities, 13% of supplier management activities, and 15% of procurement strategy activities on 
purchasing of MRO (Maintenance, Repair and Operations), indirect materials, and services. 
However, for direct material purchases, the numbers are reduced to 9%, 4%, and 4% respectively) 
for the same procurement activities (Monczka et al., 2005). 
The German bank, Deutsche Bank has outsourced all their procurement to Accenture Inc (Bills, 
2004). “However, Deutsche Bank have chosen to retain responsibility over supplier selection 
and relationships, approvals, authorization and payments. It appears that they are not prepared 
to fully step away from this non-core activity” (Parry, 2006, pp. 436-443).  
2.5.1  A successful history ---- Thames Water (England) 
Thames Water is UK’s largest water utility, With 12 million customers covering 5,000 square 
miles in and around London (Favre et al., 2003). They are responsible for clean water supply and 
wastewater management. Under the pressure of different regulations and cost reduction, they 
have chosen to outsource their procurement function (procurement of over 5000 different items) 
to an international procurement outsourcing service provider, and the following success belong 
to them: Overall operating costs was saved for $150 million, cost reduction of 35% on service 
and materials, 50% reduction in inventory, customer service is significantly improved and 
materials availability has been raised dramatically to over 99% (Favre et al., 2003). 
2.5.2 A fiasco with complication-outsourcing of IT  
The following case is provided by van Weele (2010), in his book “Purchasing and Supply chain 
management”. 
A major telecom player in Europe outsourced its IT-activities and call 
centers to an IT-provider. However, after two years, the telecom firm had to 
take back all the IT functions, and one of the major causes was the payment 
issue. Due to the dramatic reduction on the prices of both hardware and 
software, it seemed that, IT vendor had invested too much on such items for 
the telecom firm two years ago.  
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The IT supplier thus lowered the service level and warned the telecom firm 
for temporary stop or disruption of services.  
Unfortunately, insource back the IT function became the final option for the 
telecom firm (p. 160). 
Although procurement practices has been in the market for some years, very many have 
succeeded in this area, but there has also been many who fail to implement this strategy.  Some 
research show that procurement outsourcing so far has been much more frequently practiced on 
operational level rather than on the strategic levels.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
 Research design 
Research design is a master plan, which specifies the methods and procedures to collect and 
analyze the demanded information. It aims to ensure the information collected is appropriate to 
solve problems (Zikmund, 2003).  
The survey of this thesis was carried out through a questionnaire, which is qualitative in its nature.  
 Sampling population 
This study covers all 103 clients of the procurement outsourcing provider-Inventura, a 
Norwegian company, which offers professional procurement service to both public institutions 
and private enterprises. After sorting out the infeasible contacts (no available contact information 
such as email or telephone numbers), there were in total 88 procurement responsible personals 
who received the questionnaire in their emails.  
 Data collection 
In general, research data is divided into two different categories: primary data and secondary data. 
Distinction between them is based on the origins of sources the data is collected from. (Walliman, 
2001). 
3.3.1 Primary data 
In this thesis, primary data was collected through a semi-structured questionnaire. 
A semi-structured questionnaire is a mix of unstructured and structured questionnaires. Some of 
the questions and answer options are determined in advance, while others were left to open 
answers. In this research, the structured questions were organized as multiple choices while 
unstructured questions were organized as open questions which offer open answers. 
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By such a method, will the answers of structured questions offer possibilities for researchers to 
collect, compare and analyze the intended questions systematically, while open answers open up 
new insights for researchers. 
3.3.2 Secondary data 
Secondary data was obtained through different websites, in order to discover the services 
different respondents work in and their enterprise culture. 
 Validity, Reliability and triangulation 
Validity, reliability and triangulation are three important concepts of a research work. 
3.4.1 Validity 
Validity and reliability are two factors that qualitative researchers should be concerned about 
while designing a study, analyzing results and judging the quality of the study, states Patton 
(2001). It is therefore important that the research is valid and reliable, when to draw robust and 
general conclusions from a study.  
Validity is the degree to which the researcher is measuring what he is intended to measure. 
(Salmond, 2008) - “fitness for purpose” (Pierce, 2007, pp. 79-99).  
3.4.2 Reliability 
 “Consistency, stability, and repeatability (Salmond, 2008, pp. 28-30)”, is the key issue when 
checking whether a questionnaire is reliable or not. She (Salmond, 2008) explains further that, if 
the instrument is reliable, consistent and stable the results will remain same, if the same 
questionnaire will be conducted again short after the first time. This is also called test-retest 
reliability.  
The above concept is maybe true in a quantitative research, but in a qualitative research context, 
it seems hard to get the same results if the questionnaire will be carried on again. Because the 
respondents’ knowledge and perception of the questions may change with time. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) states that: "Since there can be no validity without reliability, a 
demonstration of the former [validity] is sufficient to establish the latter [reliability;]" (p.316). 
This can be interpreted as reliability is a consequence of the validity in a research (Patton, 2001). 
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3.4.3 Triangulation 
 According to Golafshani (2003), Triangulation is a typical strategy (test) to improve the validity 
and reliability of research or evaluation of findings. 
Creswell & Miller (2000) states that triangulation can be understood as “a validity procedure 
where researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information 
to form themes or categories in a study” (p.126). This implies that triangulation utilizes multiple 
methods of data collection or analysis.  
In this thesis, I have applied multiple choice questions (closed), open-answer questions (open-
ended) in the questionnaire, and multi-case studies of companies’ websites to collect the data to 
ensure its validity. In addition, the chosen theory of both TCE and principal-agent theory explain 
well on the outsourcing relation between an outsourcer and procurement outsourcing service 
vendor. The two theories also explain well the behavior of the outsourcer and its agent, on 
bounded rationality, possible opportunistic actions, and cost saving concerns, and this is 
consistent with answers from respondents. 
Therefore, the research of this thesis is valid and thus reliable.  
When the study is valid and reliable, the researcher can analyze the results, and draw conclusions 
accordingly with confidence. 
 Pretest of the survey  
In order to avoid misunderstandings, difficult languages, and difficulties on operating answering 
techniques on internet, a pretest was conducted. The questionnaire was sent to both classmates 
of mine and senior researchers for pretest. After some trials and editions, the questionnaire was 
then finally distributed. 
 Ethics 
This study has followed the “Code of Standards and Ethics for Survey Research”, which states 
“survey Research Organizations be responsible for protecting from disclosure to third parties—
including Clients and members of the Public—the identity of individual Respondents as well as 
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respondent identifiable information, unless the Respondent expressly requests or permits such 
disclosure” (Casro, 2016, p.2). 
In this thesis, the data obtained from respondents has only been visible to the researcher, and no 
information disclosure to third parties. 
 Limitations of the survey 
The sample size of the survey is rather small. There were only 9 responses of the survey. Thus, 
the analysis of the data received is also limited by its size. This implies that the analysis is not 
generalizable to a bigger population, for example to all companies or other industrial segments 
in Norway.  
 Flaws of this survey  
The questionnaire was developed before the literature review was completed, which implies that 
the survey was designed more on a common science than on a systematic approach. This led to 
the problem that when the data was collected, some of it was hard to interpret. To some degree, 
inconsistencies between the literature review and analysis might have originated form such 
discrepancies. 
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Chapter 4 Survey results, analysis and discussions 
In this section, the survey results will be presented, analysis of them will be carried on, and I will 
also try to discuss the two of the theories and some of the phenomenon. 
 Response rate in the sample 
In the first round, I received 7 responses out of 88 distributed questionnaires. After additional 
effort (calling on more respondents to commit to filling in and returning the questionnaire), two 
more responses were received. Therefore, in total, there were 9 responses out of 88 invitations, 
which gives around ten percent (10%) of response rate. This gives a rather small sample to 
analyze. However, perhaps not any small that we might have anticipated. This clearly points 
toward the usefulness and necessity of complementing eventual future research in this domain 
with qualitative, single or few investigations on respondents, through interviews, observations or 
workshops. 
Within this sample, there were two respondents from public sectors, a university college and a 
small community. Seven respondents are from private enterprises, including an energy firm, an 
oil and gas service company, and a food company, among others, which represent a broad range 
of outsourcers. 
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 Motivations behind outsourcing decisions 
The question concerning this issue is a multiple choice question with five answering possibilities. 
Four of the answering choices are predefined motives while “other motivations” is an open-ended 
choice. The answers from different procurement representatives is displayed on the table. 
Table 4-1  Motivations behind outsourcing action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
1. Firstly, this is a surprising result. Due to the massive stresses on core competence in different 
literatures of outsourcing, it was expected that the first motivation behind outsourcing 
decisions shall be consistent with literatures-focus on core competence. However, our result 
shows that to apply external (PO service vendors’ networks and knowledge) as first priority 
when considering outsourcing the procurement function. 
Perhaps this an indication that the outsourcing of procurement practice in Norway has 
evolved to the third generation of outsourcing-transformational outsourcing. 
2. Secondly, as the ranking list indicates, to lower TPC is ranked as number three, after core 
business focus and applying external knowledge and networks. This is consistent with the 
concept that the outsourcing action has evolved from a tactical era to a strategic era, which is 
to say the drive behind outsourcing has changed from to lower cost to a more strategic-
oriented direction. 
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3. Thirdly, it is identified that the two companies who didn’t choose “To focus on core business” 
as one of their motivations to choose PO service, belongs to food and beverage industry. This 
might imply it is difficult to identify what is core business or core competence in such a field.  
 What procurement function were outsourced? 
The outsourced procurement function in different organizations are presented below: 
Table 4-2  Outsourced procurement function 
What were outsourced? Responses Rank 
Contract negotiation 6 1st 
Insurance( open answer) 2 2nd 
Selection of suppliers 2 2nd 
 
4.3.1 Contract negotiation  
Contract negotiation seems to be the most outsourced activity. As it recalls, in supplier selection 
phase, contract negotiation is a key activity, and it involves price settlement, payment and 
delivery terms agreement, penalty clauses agreement and more. Only by price settlement, it has 
several different methods, such as fixed price, cost plus contract and more. All these activities 
needs economic, legal experts’ professional knowledge, and it is hence not difficult to understand 
why this part of activities is mostly outsourced. 
4.3.2 Insurance work 
Insurance work indeed also involve much expertise on economy and law, hence, it can also be 
categorized into contract negotiation. 
4.3.3 Selection of suppliers 
In the literature review part, it was illustrated that contract negotiation is part of the selection of 
suppliers’ process. However, contract negotiation and supplier selection can also be considered 
as two separated activities, which contract negotiation happens after the suppliers are finalized. 
The data collected seems to support this idea, since two identical respondents chose both 
“selection of suppliers” and “contract negotiation” as their outsourced activities. Outsourcing 
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does not have to be the only option when the companies lack internal procurement capacities. 
Technological innovation and advances IT infrastructures, such as a recommender systems, may 
also be a possibility. 
4.3.3.1 Recommender systems  
With the development of IT technology, excessive information becomes a problem when 
searching for certain information. How to offer the most precise and relevant information for a 
user becomes an issue. This is where recommender systems comes in. It is in alignment with e-
commerce, and in the context of this article, with e-procurement.  
By definition, recommender systems represent an information filtering technology, which 
present information on items and service that are likely to be of interest to the customer (Resnick 
and Varian 1997). 
As Bensch (2012) advocates, recommendation systems can support process steps in procurement. 
It supports the product- and supplier identification, and assist in this respect in decision making 
(Gil and Garcia 2003). 
Recommender systems have in recent years much been applied to different fields, film industry, 
music industry and dating websites are some common examples. As some of us may have 
experienced, when registered on a dating website, the system will recommend some potential 
partners for us. By such a way, it targets better what a man/ woman is searching for, based on the 
profile themselves have filled in into the system. The same principle works also on a procurement 
process.   
By applying recommender systems, it will save the buyer from endless effort on supplier research, 
hence, save cost.  
As this class of systems might also help the customer to find the ideal suppliers, a new question 
arrives: which method to choose- Recommender systems or outsourcing? 
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4.3.3.2 Recommender systems vs outsourcing? 
After searching on previous research on this topic at academic resources and common websites, 
no information turned out to be available, on the comparison of these two systems. This indicates 
that this thesis’s analysis of its potential might contribute to a new research field.  
Table 4-3   Recommender systems VS outsourcing 
 Recommender systems Outsourcing 
Cost New IT program setup cost, 
training cost 
Searching cost, service 
purchase cost, contract cost, 
governance cost 
Risk Less   More ( opportunistic 
behavior by agent, 
information asymmetry) 
 
Table 4-3 is a simple framework, it surely is not enough to explain the differences between these 
two mechanisms, but it perhaps offer a guideline of it and may lead to some new inspirations to 
future researches.  
 Incremental or complete outsourcing? 
When how much the firms asked outsourced their procurement function, the 7 private enterprises 
answered with less than 20% while the 2 public sectors, which include a community and a 
university college chose 41%-60% and 61%-80% as their answers.  
This is an interesting result: 
1. No firm outsource their procurement function 100%, which is to say, no one has applied 
complete outsourcing. This leads to a new research question, which is “why”? 
2. It is obvious that, public sectors outsource more of their procurement functions than 
private enterprises. What is the reason behind this? Can they learn from each other and 
how? This remains for future research. 
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 Satisfaction level of PO services 
Satisfaction level of PO services, from the survey, is presented below. 
Table 4-4   Satisfaction level of PO services 
Satisfaction level Reponses ( 9 in total) Percentages 
Satisfied 4 44% 
Indifferent 4 44% 
Very satisfied 1 12% 
 
As we see, most respondents either are satisfied or feel no difference about the procurement 
performance before and after outsourcing. This is an indication that outsourcing is not a universal 
medicine, which will only bring positive outcomes. It has also its side effects, such as difficult to 
cooperate with suppliers, and internal resistance and hidden cost (see 2.4.2 and 4.8 about 
challenges on procurement outsourcing). This may have reduced the outsourcers’ satisfaction 
levels of PO services.  
By” Indifferent”, we may understand it as: Transaction cost equals to production cost, led to 
indifference of outsourcing outcomes. But it is perhaps a much more complicated issue in reality. 
Similar to this finding, Michael Corbett (2002, as cited in van Weele, 2010) found “Satisfaction 
with service providers is strong but there are some concerns. Only 60% of executive are satisfied 
with their outsourcing initiatives and only 11% of the executives are very satisfied” (p.167). 
Different from this finding, Monczka et al (2005) reports that 9-31% of the buyer are not satisfied 
with the outsourcing results. 
As concluded by van Weele(2010), although the findings on satisfaction level varies from 
research to research, outsourcing as business as strategy is blooming both in USA and Europe. 
The data from Table 4-4   indicates that the current purchasing service providers haven’t been 
able to deliver prominent services to their customers, and the development of outsourcing 
purchasing activity still has a long way to go. 
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 Hidden cost 
When asked about the potential reduction of procurement cost, 7 respondents answered with 1-
20%, 1 respondent (the university college) with 21-41%, while 1 respondent has answered with 
“procurement cost was increased”. This is a hint that there is much space for improvement on 
the performance of outsourcing procurement functions, since the general satisfaction level is not 
high. 
4.6.1 Interpretation of “procurement cost was increased” 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) advocates that when Production cost is higher than 
Transaction cost, the service should be outsourced. However, our finding shows the opposite 
outcome: transaction cost is higher than production cost, after implementing outsourcing method.   
Does this violates the principles of TCE then? Maybe. 
By ”maybe”, it means the theory doesn’t distinguish the TCO and the transaction cost of the 
service. Because TCO encompasses both transaction cost and hidden (extra) cost, hence TCO is 
higher than transaction cost. 
As explained earlier, TCO (total cost of ownership) refers to the cost of lifetime of the purchased 
goods/services. By lifetime, it includes the cost of searching for it, training cost on it, 
maintenance of it, upgrading of it and more. These hidden/extra costs are invisible at the time of 
purchasing it and not calculated in the purchasing cost of it. 
“Procurement cost was increased, after outsourcing procurement functions” was experienced by 
the university college respondent. This is perhaps because the hidden cost have occurred on 
selecting the outsourcing vendor (pre-outsourcing activities). 
Hidden costs are maybe inevitable, thus, research usually aims not to eliminate it, but instead to 
offer the buyers of outsourcing services an idea of what might bring them extra cost, and thus 
contribute to  a more reliable budget and expectation of the outcomes.  
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 Experienced benefits by outsourcing 
Data obtained from the multiple-choice questions about what respondents have experienced after 
outsourcing of their procurement activities, are summarized in the following table: 
Table 4-5   Experienced benefits by outsourcing 
  
As we can see, the most experienced benefits by outsourcing are cost savings, core business focus 
and knowledge sharing from suppliers respectively. Shorter lead time, smaller lots and lower 
rejection rates were less frequently experienced outsourcing benefits. 
This is to say that the operational activities are experienced less beneficial than tactical 
management and strategic enterprise levels.  
 Experienced challenges by outsourcing 
For predefined answers, such as “too dependent on outsource vendor”, “reduced control on 
procurement progression” and “difficult to cooperate with outsource vendor”, it was 2 
respondents, who experienced each of these challenges, respectively. 
These problems are experienced rather evenly, and not in a high rate.  
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4.8.1 Reduced control on procurement progression 
As illustrated earlier, the type of outsourcing implemented by the researched companies is partial 
or incremental outsourcing. Moreover, as described in section 2.2.2, partial outsourcing can be 
understood as only a part of an integrated function is outsourced (van Weele, 2010p.162), while 
the coordination responsibilities and power still is in the hand of outsourcer. It seems the reality 
is inconsistent with this definition. By partially outsourcing some function, some of the 
responsibilities and coordination power will inevitably be transferred to the vendor, since 
otherwise, the outsourcer and its agent would have to work on the process under constant 
supervision. Therefore, reduced control on procurement progression is a natural risk associated 
with the outsourcing strategy.  
The question next is how to maintain the reduced control to an acceptable level. This remains 
also for future research. However, one improvement can be made is to redefine what is partial 
outsourcing. 
An improved version of van Weele’ s definition of partial outsourcing is that, partial outsourcing 
is to outsource  a part of an integrated function , while the coordination responsibilities and power 
still are “SHARED BY BOTH SUPPLIERS AND OUTSOURCERS”.  
4.8.2 Difficult to co-operate with outsource vendor 
As principal-agent theory claims, the objective of principal and agent is not always in alignment. 
Because of the information asymmetry, outsource provider may behave opportunistically, and it 
is even almost impossible to observe and to document it. 
When the conflict of interests occurs, it will be difficult to cooperate by the two parties in order 
to achieve a win-win agreement. 
How to solve these difficulties becomes the next question. 
My suggestion is to improve the information transparency, especially from the agent side. 
By “Other challenges” option (open-ended), the answers are very different from each other. 
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4.8.3 The speed of change was slower due to complex access to 
necessary documentation to make the outsourcing change; 
Functional in-compatibility among different departments due 
to different systems 
Complex access to necessary documentation may arise from outsourcing vendor. Due to system 
incompatibility between outsourcing vendor and the buyer, it may slow down the access to 
documentation, hence communication, coordination and fulfillment of the outsourcing process. 
During a procurement process, it requires much communication, coordination and cooperation 
between the outsourcer and outsourcing service vendor to speed up the access to necessary 
documentation hence increase the speed of outsourcing implantation. Hence, to improve 
relationship management can be an important issue in a procurement outsourcing process. 
4.8.4 Service was not customized, and needs were not met accurately. 
The experienced problem of un-customized service and demand were not met accurately indicate 
that a governance on outsourcing process is necessary.  
Although the function is outsourced, its dynamic and complex nature still exists. It is necessary 
to continuously monitor the ongoing process, to identify what practices have been performing 
well and what might needed to be changed, or improved. A continuous communication and 
coordination with outsourcing supplier is also necessary to ensure the service received fits the 
firm well. 
Governance cost may hence bring hidden cost, and this has to be noted by outsourcers. 
4.8.5 Agreements made between trade-brokers is not so visible; 
Service providers have been too reluctant to react on delivery 
schedule and need changes 
These two problems can be illustrated by TCE and principal-agent theory. 
TCE claims there are special types of asset: physical asset such as trucks or human asset such as 
a logistics coordinator. Asset specificity is contributing to the level of customization or 
specification of the transaction (McIvor, 2008).  
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For example, to change the delivery schedule, it requires physical and human asset, hence 
transaction cost. To increase transaction cost implies the reduction of profit loss for service 
provider, this might have explained itself why service providers have been too reluctant to react 
on delivery schedule.  
Conclusion: Due to its small size, it is not convincing to draw any conclusion from the 
questionnaire. However, it is still possible to see some hints: Motivations behind outsourcing 
decision are multiple, but to share a larger network and others’ knowledge are in the mind of 
many decision makers. This matches the globalization trend, which is also one of the reasons 
why enterprises are intending to outsource procurement function. The majority of the 
organizations only outsource a very small portion of their whole procurement function. There are 
indeed differences before and after procurement outsourcing. Almost everyone has been 
experiencing the similar positive aspects: lower cost, shorter lead-time, service became more 
flexible, core business focus and knowledge shared from outsource vendors. Experienced 
challenges are quite diverse: Difficult to cooperate with outsourcing service providers, services 
offered didn’t match the company’s requirements, information asymmetry and more. Most of the 
problems can be explained by TCE and principal - agent theory while others remain for further 
research. 
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Chapter 5 Summary and future research 
This thesis aims to identify which benefits and challenges some Norwegian firms have 
experienced during and after they outsourced their procurement function to a national 
procurement outsource provider – Inventura.  
The research question in this paper is hence: What benefits and challenges have the Norwegian 
firms who outsourced their procurement function experienced and how may they implement 
strategies and processes to mitigate these challenges or risks? 
To reach this goal, the following actions have been taken: 
1. An online questionnaire was designed and distributed to Inventura’s 88 clients through 
emails and 9 responses were received, which gives around 10% response rate. Among the 
9 respondents, 2 are public institutions while the rest 7 are business enterprises. 
2. A substantial literature review has been undertaken. The purpose of taking on a review 
of earlier research is to find what problems have been investigated from this field and 
what more research needed. 
It appears that there is much literature on procurement and outsourcing, but very little 
about procurement outsourcing research, and it is almost none of the work has been done 
in a Norwegian context. This research, therefore, has potential to contribute to research 
in general and to the Norwegian society in specific. 
3. A thorough analysis of the collected data has also been undertaken. TCE and principal-
agent theory have been applied as theoretical framework to explain certain benefits and 
challenges that have occurred in implementing procurement outsourcing strategy in the 
research case.  
The analysis shows:  
a) There is probably a difference on the extent of procurement outsourcing, between public 
and private sectors. Public institutions outsource in average 50%-60% of their 
procurement function. Because of the very small population (around 2000 each) of the 
two public sectors, the interpretation of the reasons behind the high portion of outsourced 
procurement function, will be only limited to this case. The reasons behind it could be the 
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two public institutions in sample were small, and may not have project-specific needs of 
procurement. The purchased goods/services there were thus limited to routine buying, 
which hence are easier to be outsourced. Perhaps they get economic subsidiary from 
government, or do to the same extent fear for risks of loss? Maybe private enterprises 
who compete in the market, are more explicitly responsible for risks of losing money, 
bankruptcy, thus more uncertain to outsource? This remains for a future research. 
b) Respondents experienced rather similar benefits: lower rejection rate, smaller lot, cost 
savings, core business focus, and shared knowledge from outsourcing vendors. 
c) The experienced challenges by respondents are very different from each other, to name 
some of them: 
- Reduced control on procurement progression  
- Too dependent on service providers 
- Difficult to cooperate with suppliers 
- Service offered are not tailor-made 
- Information not visible 
In a general perspective, these problems can be explained by TCE and principal-agent theory. 
Limited human rationality determines we cannot predict all future situations, hence, we are not 
able to write the corresponding solutions, rewards and penalties in a contract to regular both 
parties’ performance before the situations really occur. This is to say continuous governance, re-
negotiation, coordination are required, and it will bring forth and explicate higher transaction 
cost. Human nature of self-interest, and the nature of information asymmetry in a principal-agent 
relation, may potentially be exploited by an agent to reach his/her own interest rather than a joint 
interest, and this is difficult to document. 
However, certain problems occurred cannot be explained by these two theories, such as the ways 
in which IT systems are not compatible between outsources and outsourcers and reduced control 
on procurement progression. These are natural obstacles in a business process. The questions 
might imply how we can manage a better outsourcer and outsourcing service vendor relationship, 
for the cooperation to reach a win-win situation with low cost in an overall point of views.  
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 Future work 
For procurement outsourcing services to develop, more research needs to be carried out in the 
future. Suggested areas, which have been developing from the research project documented by 
this thesis, could be:  
1. What are the reasons behind the difference between public sector’s procurement outsourcing 
portion and private sector’s procurement outsourcing portion? 
2. What could public and private sectors learn from each other’s success and failures in the 
process of implementing procurement outsourcing? 
3. What is the applicability of recommender systems to an outsourcing strategy, when choosing 
a supplier or even other areas of a business? 
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Appendix 1: Procurement outsourcing survey 
Pre- procurement outsourcing VS post- procurement outsourcing 
The intention of this research is: By comparing the situation before and after procurement 
function is outsourced, to identify the (potential) opportunities and challenges procurement 
outsourcing strategy has brought in to your firm and the offshore industry.   
When question asks something about "After outsourcing" it means to compare with situation 
before outsourcing. 
If you have any questions, please send email to 130937@stud.himolde.no 
The information from your reply will be kept confidentially. 
Thank you for your interest, it is very much appreciated. 
 
If you wish a copy of the analysis result, please write down your email address: 
Email:  
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1. What is the size of your company? 
A. Less or equal to 50 employees 
B. 51-250 employees 
C. 251-500 employees 
D. 501-1000 employees 
E. 1000 employees 
 
2. What are the motives of your firm to outsource the procurement function? 
(Multiple choice, Matrix)   
        Not motivated-A little motivated-Somewhat motivated- Quite motivated- Strongly motivated                                                    
A. To focus on the core businesses 
B. To lower the entire procurement cost 
C. To apply procurement service providers’ networks and knowledge 
D. No sufficient professional employee to perform procurement jobs 
E. Other motivations. Please describe the other motivations: 
 
3. What procurement function has your firm outsourced to a third party? 
(Multiple choice) 
A. Construction work (eg. Rig construction) 
B. Selection of supplier 
C. Contract negotiation 
D. Order placement 
E. Other functions. What other procurement functions has your firm outsourced to a third 
party company? 
4. What are your firm’s strategic goals in procurement? (Multiple choice) 
A. Low cost 
B. Low rejection rate 
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C. Short lead time 
D. On-time delivery 
E. Service flexibility - ability to quickly respond to changes in delivery schedule and procure 
new / different goods 
F. Long term cooperation with suppliers 
G. Other strategic goals. Please describe the other strategic goals your firm has in 
procurement functions: 
5. Please estimate how much of procurement activities has your firm 
outsourced: 
A. 1%-20% 
B. 21%-40% 
C. 41%-60% 
D. 61%-80% 
E. 81%-100% 
6. How much is your firm satisfied with the procurement performance 
delivered by the outsourced suppliers? 
A. Very Dissatisfied. Please explain what made you dissatisfied: 
B. Dissatisfied. Please explain what made you dissatisfied: 
C. Indifferent  
D. Satisfied  
E. Very Satisfied 
7. After outsourcing, how much has the lead-time of goods delivery from 
suppliers been decreased? 
A. 0% 
B. 1%-20% 
C. 21%-40% 
D. 41%-60% 
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E. 61%-80% 
F. 81%-100 
G. Lead-time increased. Please explain why the lead-time of goods delivery from suppliers 
was increased but not decreased:  
8. After outsourcing, how much has your firm saved on inventory cost? 
A. 0% 
B. 1%-20% 
C. 21%-40% 
D. 41%-60% 
E. 61%-80% 
F. 81%-100 
G. Inventory cost increased. Please explain why after outsourcing,  inventory cost increased 
but not decreased: 
9. After outsourcing, how much has the rejection rate of goods received been 
decreased? 
A. 0% 
B. 1%-20% 
C. 21%-40% 
D. 41%-60% 
E. 61%-80% 
F. 81%-100 
G. Rejection rate of goods received increased. Please explain why rejection rate of goods 
received  increased, after outsourcing: 
10. Please estimate the savings on procurement expenses after outsourcing 
(including administrative costs and purchasing costs). 
A. 0% 
B. 1%-20% 
C. 21%-40% 
D. 41%-60% 
E. 61%-80% 
F. 81%-100 
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G. Procurement cost increased. Please explain why procurement expenses increased, after 
outsourcing: 
11. What challenges did your firm encounter when outsourcing procurement 
function was assessed and introduced? (Matrix. All 4 choices have to be 
answered) 
   None of it A little bit Some    Much      Quite much                Very much 
A. Internal conflict (exp. fear to lose jobs) 
B. Fear for becoming too dependent on suppliers 
C. Internal information (exp. payroll) exposed to suppliers 
D. Other challenges. Please provide some examples of the challenges occurred: 
12. What benefits has your firm experienced because of outsourcing? (All 
choices have to be answered) 
A. Cost savings 
B. Innovative knowledge shared from suppliers 
C. Smaller lot 
D. Service became more flexible, able to change delivery schedules and procure 
new/different goods in a timely manner. 
E. Other. Please write down the other benefit(s): 
13. What problems has your firm confronted after procurement function is 
outsourced? (Multiple choice) 
A. Difficult to cooperate with procurement service providers 
B. Too dependent on procurement service providers 
C. Reduced control on the progression of procurement performances 
D. Integration problems relates to different procurement systems (accounting, warehouse, 
software…) 
E. Other problems. Please describe what problems  your firm has met after procurement 
function is outsourced: 
14. What negative experiences did your firm experience after outsourcing 
procurement activities? (Multiple choice) 
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A. Larger order quantity 
B. Less reliable on-time delivery. 
C. Longer fault correction time. 
D. Service became more rigid, unable to respond quickly to needed changes in delivery 
schedule / procure different goods. 
E. Other negative experiences. Please state:     
 
